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Abstract 
 
The sustainability of fiscal policy and how to finance the deficit budget has been 
receiving increasing attention from economists. The issue is paramount for the Muslim 
Countries and this is one of the motivations of the paper. In order to assess the sustainability 
of budget deficits in selected Muslim countries, a descriptive statistics for the stock of 
revenue, expenditure, tax over GDP and sustainability tests of government debt and deficit 
are performed for the Muslim countries for the 1971-2000 period. The cointegration model is 
also used to test the relationship between government expenditures, taxes, and seigniorage. 
The results show that the Muslim countries use taxes and seigniorage to finance their 
government expenditures. The empirical results also allow us to conclude that fiscal policy 
may be sustainable for most Muslim countries.  
 
JEL classification: E60; H62; H63; 
Keywords: deficit finance; inter-temporal budget constraint; fiscal policy; monetary policy; 
islamic countries. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The fiscal deficits and the govern-
ment debt in 1980’s and 1990’s have sharply 
increased, either in the developed and de-
veloping countries or countries in transition. 
Several Islamic countries which are known 
as countries in transition also have been ex-
posed to the increasing amount of govern-
ment debt and fiscal deficits. The increasing 
amount of government debt and the fiscal 
deficits are expected to pose a serious threat 
to the country’s economic development. The 
high fiscal deficits must be financed either 
by borrowing or by printing money (seign-
iorage). The borrowing policy (i.e. deferred 
taxation) may redistribute during the life-
time the resources of the younger to the 
older generations and from the unborn to 
current generations, cause financial crowd-
ing out of the private sector, and reduce the 
level of establishing domestic fixed capital.  
When the government reaches the 
limit of the amount of the debt that the do-
mestic private sector and the rest of the 
world absorb voluntarily, the monetization 
of the deficit is an alternative financial op-
tion. But, the expansion of money supply 
can increase the expected inflation rates, and 
hence, increase in the nominal interest rate, 
and depreciation of the national currency. 
Several Muslim countries worry that 
a dramatic rise in the government debt de-
rails the sound economic growth as has been 
seen in developed countries, including U.S., 
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U.K., Germany and Japan. Although, in 
some Muslim countries like Bahrain and 
Oman, debt to the GDP, as reported in Table 
1, are still lower than those of some devel-
oped economies most of which vary from 
40% to 60%, as shown in Table 2. However, 
government debt, once it begins to accumu-
late, tends to surge continuously due to 
growing interest payment burden.  
 
Table 1: Government Revenues, Expenditures, Debts,  
and Taxes in the Muslim Countries (as a % of GDP) 
 
Country Items 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Mean 
Bahrain Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.350 
0.132 
0.007 
0.160 
0.303 
0.264 
0.028 
0.144 
0.336 
0.274 
0.084 
0.044 
0.366 
0.370 
0.074 
0.075 
0.295 
0.318 
0.087 
0.076 
0.239 
0.270 
0.170 
0.077 
0.356 
0.259 
0.293 
0.070 
0.321 
0.269 
0.106 
0.081 
Cameroon Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.175 
0.188 
0.262 
0.203 
0.150 
0.178 
-0.006 
0.136 
0.170 
0.164 
0.217 
0.155 
0.219 
0.209 
0.176 
0.172 
0.156 
0.213 
0.359 
0.108 
0.123 
0.120 
1.320 
0.089 
0.133 
0.132 
0.908 
0.109 
0.160 
0.171 
0.501 
0.129 
Guyana Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.244 
0.308 
0.428 
0.222 
0.427 
0.475 
0.757 
0.403 
0.349 
0.601 
2.438 
0.297 
0.398 
0.791 
4.433 
0.411 
0.360 
0.698 
5.853 
0.000 
0.349 
0.400 
3.653 
0.000 
0.331 
0.427 
2.393 
0.014 
0.352 
0.529 
2.857 
0.190 
Indonesia Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.120 
0.145 
0.994 
0.510 
0.181 
0.205 
0.315 
0.227 
0.229 
0.238 
0.186 
0.218 
0.207 
0.211 
0.317 
0.180 
0.188 
0.184 
0.424 
0.178 
0.177 
0.147 
0.308 
0.160 
0.164 
0.178 
0.480 
0.144 
0.193 
0.192 
0.321 
0.176 
Jordan Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.158 
0.379 
0.349 
0.144 
0.218 
0.484 
0.414 
0.154 
0.196 
0.445 
0.377 
0.143 
0.218 
0.353 
0.555 
0.151 
0.279 
0.375 
2.051 
0.191 
0.291 
0.327 
1.038 
0.205 
0.255 
0.316 
0.951 
0.198 
0.231 
0.383 
0.819 
0.169 
Malaysia Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.187 
0.268 
0.470 
0.163 
0.229 
0.314 
0.488 
0.202 
0.261 
0.331 
0.434 
0.235 
0.272 
0.329 
0.817 
0.235 
0.248 
0.277 
0.795 
0.191 
0.229 
0.221 
0.411 
0.199 
0.196 
0.228 
0.374 
0.000 
0.220 
0.254 
0.472 
0.117 
Oman Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.401 
0.373 
0.006 
0.300 
0.495 
0.644 
0.199 
0.137 
0.388 
0.388 
0.083 
0.109 
0.516 
0.668 
0.250 
0.160 
0.354 
0.359 
0.197 
0.094 
0.280 
0.371 
0.291 
0.074 
0.240 
0.286 
0.191 
0.057 
0.382 
0.441 
0.174 
0.133 
Pakistan Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.145 
0.158 
0.517 
0.000 
1.275 
1.746 
6.632 
1.089 
0.156 
0.172 
0.550 
0.128 
0.163 
0.198 
0.763 
0.123 
0.192 
0.225 
0.910 
0.138 
0.172 
0.228 
0.751 
0.132 
0.164 
0.221 
0.893 
0.122 
0.324 
0.421 
1.574 
0.247 
Sierra Lyon Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.155 
0.166 
0.244 
0.160 
0.169 
0.274 
0.326 
0.146 
0.164 
0.289 
0.663 
0.148 
0.066 
0.132 
0.778 
0.059 
0.056 
0.083 
0.990 
0.059 
0.094 
0.163 
1.037 
0.090 
0.114 
0.279 
1.794 
0.071 
0.122 
0.208 
0.834 
0.106 
Tunisia Revenue 
Expenditure 
Debt 
Tax 
0.280 
0.274 
0.454 
0.235 
0.315 
0.327 
0.323 
0.257 
0.321 
0.324 
0.348 
0.245 
0.340 
0.365 
0.455 
0.244 
0.307 
0.346 
0.548 
0.240 
0.300 
0.327 
0.575 
0.250 
0.283 
0.317 
0.620 
0.258 
0.307 
0.326 
0.475 
0.247 
The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy and Deficit Budget … (Muhammad Zilal Hamzah & Abd. Ghafar b. Ismail) 
 187 
Table 2: Government Debts of Four Advanced Countries (as a % of GDP) 
 
Country 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
United State 0.281 0.267 0.264 0.379 0.442 0.500 0.343 
United Kingdom 0.583 0.506 0.463 0.466 0.334 0.467 0.000 
Germany   0.271a 0.218 0.438 0.580 0.602 
Japan  0.162 0.404 0.536 0.543 0.000 0.000 
Notes: a = 1983 
 
The increasing amount of govern-
ment debt has produced raising concern 
about the sustainability of government defi-
cits and fiscal consolidation. Already quite a 
lot of literature has studied the issue of fiscal 
sustainability. For example, Artis and 
Marcelino (1998), Athanasios and Sidiro-
poulos (1999), Baglioni and Cherubini 
(1993), Bohn (1995), Buiter and Patel 
(1992), Haug (1991), Makrydakis, Tzavalis 
and Balfoussias (1999). Since, this issue is 
paramount for the Muslim countries and this 
is one of the motivations of this paper. 
The government revenues that come 
from taxes or seigniorage have important 
role to improve fiscal deficit. But, the exces-
sive seigniorage may generate the problem 
to monetary sector. It implies that the expan-
sionary of monetary policy may distort the 
economic  activities. Hence, there is a need 
to harmonize the monetary and fiscal poli-
cies in order to balance between increasing 
taxes and price level. 
Thus, the main purpose of this paper 
is to provide an overview of fiscal and 
monetary stance for the last three decades 
and the policy implications for fiscal con-
solidation by assessing fiscal sustainability 
and long run (cointegration) relationship in 
Muslim countries. The remaining discussion 
of this paper will be divided into four sec-
tions. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical 
framework, focusing on the present value 
budget constraint (PVBC) which forms the 
basis for stationary test of fiscal policy. The 
tests of sustainability will be performed in 
Section 3. Historical facts about fiscal sus-
tainability in the Muslim countries and the 
empirical test of the sustainability hypothe-
sis and cointegration results are the main 
focus in section 4. And conclusion is given 
in section 5. 
 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The writing about the public debt 
problem was first mentioned by Keynes 
(1923) in the beginning of the 1920s. He 
alerted to the need for the French govern-
ment to conduct a sustainable fiscal policy 
in order to satisfy its budget constraint. 
Keynes also stated that the absence of sus-
tainability would be evident when the gov-
ernment’s liabilities have reached an exces-
sive proportion of the national income. 
In the current terms, sustainability is 
challenged when the debt-to-GDP ratio 
reaches an excessive value. There is a prob-
lem of sustainability when the government 
revenues are not enough to keep on financ-
ing the costs associated to new issuance of 
public debt. In other words, the sustainabil-
ity issue becomes clear when the claims of 
the bond-holders are more than the tax-
payers can support. At this stage, the gov-
ernment need to take measures that allow 
regaining the sustainability of fiscal policy, 
i.e., the government must come in due 
course to some compromise between in-
creasing taxation, and diminishing expendi-
ture, and reducing debt. 
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The renewed interest on this issue has 
encouraged researchers such as Blanchard et 
al (1990) to present a definition of sustain-
able fiscal policy.  In the short-term, this 
policy allows the debt-to-GDP ratio returns 
to its original level after some excessive 
variation. Hence, for a fiscal policy to be 
sustainable, after having accumulated debt 
in the past, the government must run sur-
pluses in the future. 
In the following discussion, the defi-
nitions for fiscal policy sustainability will be 
presented. In every period, the fiscal sus-
tainability that satisfies a static budget con-
straint can be written as: 
Bt = (1 + rt)Bt-1 + Dt ............................... (1)  
where Bt is the government debt at period t, 
r is the discount rate, and D is the fiscal 
deficit.  
Rewriting equation (1) for periods 
t+1, t+2, t+3, …, and recursively solving 
that equation leads to the following inter-
temporal budget constraint: 
Bt-1= 


βj+1Dt+j + 
j
lim βj+1Bt+j  ........... (2) 
where  β=1/(1+r) and βj+1 is the discount 
factor applying between periods t and t+j. 
From equation (2), sustainability requires 
that the present value of future surpluses 
must exceed the present value of deficits by 
a sufficient amount to cover the difference 
between the initial debt stock and the pre-
sent value of the terminal debt stock. 
If the present value of the terminal 
debt stock is positive, equation (2) can be 
satisfied even if a government rolls over its 
debt in full every period by borrowing to 
cover both principal and interest payments. 
However, when the limit term is zero, this 
means that in the long run the government 
will have to stop using Ponzi games to fi-
nance fiscal deficits. Therefore, the govern-
ment cannot roll over its debt in full every 
period. 
Bt-1=- 


βj+1Dt+j  ................................  (3) 
Thus, a no-Ponzi game restriction is 
typically regarded as synonymous with sus-
tainability, which implies that the transver-
sality condition, lim βj+1Bt+j, has to hold. In 
fact, this condition will hold as equality 
since individual investors cannot end up 
being indebted to the government, which 
means constraining the debt to grow no 
faster than the interest rate. Consequently, a 
sustainable fiscal policy has to satisfy the 
inter-temporal budget constraint (PVBC). 
That is, sustainability requires that an excess 
of future primary surpluses over primary 
deficits match the current stock of govern-
ment debt in present value terms. 
Fiscal sustainability can be used to in 
every countries can be reached with opti-
malized the resource of taxes and seign-
iorage. It can be optimalized if the distor-
tionary cost for both of resources are mini-
mized (Mankiw 1987). For this condition, 
every country must running the fiscal and 
monetary policy in one synchronization. 
To understand the impact of mone-
tary policy and fiscal policy for the budget 
deficit which financed by borrowing, the 
following approach of budget constraint will 
be used: 
P/M)TG(  ................................  (4) 
where G is the government expenditures, T 
is taxes, and P/M  is represents the 
amount of government spending that must 
be financed through creating more money or 
also known as seigniorage revenue. Hence, 
the seigniorage can be write as:  
St = ΔM/P = (Mt – Mt/Pt) ......................  (5) 
The equation of budget constraint 
will generate the implication that the present 
value of the revenues equals to government 
expenditures. To know weather budget con-
straint are running well, cointegration test 
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has done for a set of variables, that are: pub-
lic expenditures (G), taxes (T), and seign-
iorage rate (S), with assumption of all vari-
ables are not stationer at level but stationer 
at first different. The function can be write 
as: 
Gt =f (Tt,St) ............................................ (6) 
Meanwhile to know weather fiscal 
policy and monetary policy done synchroni-
zation, cointegration test has done for a set 
of variables, that are: public expenditures 
(G), taxes (T), and general price rate (P). 
The function can be write as: 
Gt =f (Tt,Pt) ........................................... (7) 
For the cointegration test, this study 
use the Johansen Cointegration Test and 
data is in the log data. 
 
SUSTAINABILITY TESTS 
We are now interested in the question 
of whether the creditors could rationally 
expect the government budget would be 
balanced in the present-value terms. If the 
PVBC holds for historical data, then the null 
hypothesis 
lim βj+1Bt+j = 0 ....................................... (8) 
will not be rejected in statistical tests. 
Then, the appropriate sustainability 
test is to examine if the historical process 
that generate fiscal data is, as mentioned by 
Chalk and Hemming (2000), likely to result 
in the PVBC eventually being violated. If 
so, fiscal policy and thus the data generating 
process will have to be changed and current 
policy should be regarded as unsustainable. 
Equation (2) is mathematically 
equivalent to equation (5), the model pro-
posed for studying self-fulfilling hyperinfla-
tion and applied by Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986). 
Bt =A0(1 + r)t – Et   βj+1 Dt+j + εt .......... (9)  
Where the operator Et denotes the expecta-
tions of creditors and  εt is the regression 
disturbance term reflecting expected 
changes in real short-term interest rates, the 
term structure of long rates and measure-
ment error. Hamilton and Flavin suggest 
that, for any stationary process for (εt, Et 
 βj+1 Dt+j), when A0=0, Bt will be station-
ary, whereas A0 >0, Bt will not be stationary. 
They also propose that the test to de-
termine whether A0=0 is based on the obser-
vation that if the process for the discounted 
sum of future deficits is stationary, then Bt is 
stationary if and only if A0=0. It should be 
noted here that this is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for sustainability, fiscal 
policy could be sustainable even if debt is 
nonstationary. 
The annual data is used to test 
whether the bubble term turns out not to be 
zero and the hypothesis that fiscal policy 
should be regarded as sustainable. Our data-
base includes the 57 Islamic countries, but 
lack of financial data restricts the analysis to 
about 10 countries. The data are compiled 
from International Financial Statistics and 
Government Financial Statistics and pub-
lished by International Monetary Fund. 
 
THE RESULT  
This section will summarize the styl-
ized facts about the fiscal policy sustainabil-
ity in the Muslim countries and the empiri-
cal test of the sustainability hypothesis. Fi-
nally, the cointegration results will also be 
presented in this section. 
 
Some Stylized Facts 
As reported in Table 1 (also see 
graph 1), between the ends of 1971s and the 
ends of 2000 there was an increasing trend 
of the debt-to-GDP ratio for most countries 
throughout the period. It can be divided in to 
two significant periods that are the period of 
year 1987-1992 and the period of year 1997-
2000. This period shows that in generally, 
every ten years cyclically, the countries 
faced for the crisis of economic. For exam-
 Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan Vol. 10 No. 3, Desember 2005 Hal: 185 – 202 
190 
ple, public debt rose slightly in Bahrain from 
0.7 per cent of GDP in 1971 to 29.3 per cent 
of GDP in 2000. Bahrain has the lowest 
debt-to GDP ratio among the countries. 
Cameroon, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Oman, and Tunisia have the moderate level 
of debt among that countries. The highest 
level of debt-to-GDP among them just be-
tween 90 per cent until 100 per cent.  
The highest reported debt-to-GDP ratios are 
in Guyana, Pakistan, and Sierra Lyon. The 
percentage of debt-to-GDP in Guyana rose 
from 42.8 in 1971 to 585.3 in 1990 and be-
come 615.2 in 1991, in Pakistan 663.2 in 
1975, and in Sierra Lyon 247 per cent in 
1999. But Guyana and Pakistan could main-
tain the debt successfully and reduced the 
debt until 239 per cent and 89.3 in the ends 
2000 (eventhough this percentage still high). 
“Maastricht Agreement” (criteria for fiscal 
confergence of the Maastricht Agreement) 
the gross public debt notto exceed 60 per 
cent of GDP). 
 
Graph 1: Percentage debt to GDP of ten Muslim countries  
from year 1971 until year 2000 
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The percentage of government ex-
penditure and revenue to GDP for each 
Muslim country is shown Table 1 (also see 
Graph 2 and Graph 3). The main conclusion 
is that the burden of public expenditures and 
revenues on GDP has increased since the 
1970’s for almost every country, except for 
Indonesia. Even, in year 1982 and year 1986 
public expenditures in Guyana reach more 
than 100 per cent of its GDP. Also another 
obvious fact is that for most countries, the 
ratio of government expenditures to GDP 
exhibited a higher growth rate than the ratio 
of government revenues to GDP. That 
means, every country has the deficit budget. 
The highest deficit budget holds by Guyana 
especially in the period of 1982-1986. This 
conclusion holds for all countries except for 
Bahrain and Cameroon.  
Both the growth of seigniorage and 
taxes as the indicator of expansionary mone-
tary and fiscal policies are shown in Graphs 
4 and 5, respectively. Sierra Lyon shows the 
highest growth of seigniorage. It reaches the 
highest level 94 per cent of GDP in year 
1982. Its mean Sierra Lyon gets the revenue 
from the monetary sector more than the fis-
cal sector. Mean a while, another 9 countries 
(which have the same volality about the 
seigniorage policy) get the revenue from the 
fiscal sector more than the monetary sector.  
 
Graph 2: Percentage deficits over GDP of ten Muslim Countries  
from year 1971 until year 2000 
 
-0.8 
-0.6 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 
DEFBAH 
DEFCAM 
DEFGUY 
DEFIND 
DEFJOR 
DEFMAL 
DEFOM 
DEFPAK 
DEFSIE 
DEFTUN 
Pe
rce
nta
ge
 o
f G
DP
 
Year 
 
 Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan Vol. 10 No. 3, Desember 2005 Hal: 185 – 202 
192 
Graph 3: Percentage Government expenditures over GDP of ten Muslim Countries 
from year 1971 until year 2000 
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Graph 4: Percentage seigniorage over GDP of ten Muslim Countries 
from year 1971 until year 2000 
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Graph 5: Percentage taxes over GDP of ten Muslim Countries  
from year 1971 until year 2000 
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Sustainability Tests 
The study of public debt (B) and 
budget deficit (D) stationarity for each Mus-
limic country will be explained below. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillip-
Peron Test are used in the attempt to vali-
date the sufficient sustainability condition. 
Table 3 and 4 give the stationarity tests re-
sults for the level of the public debt and 
budget deficit, with the sample period 
shown in column two. The critical 1 and 5 
percent τ values with intercept are -3.75 and 
-3.00, respectively. 
The results from the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are reported in 
Table 3. The results show that the process 
(1-L)D is stationary in Cameroon, Guyana, 
Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, and Tunisia. The 
process (1-L)B is stationary in Pakistan. 
Similarly, the Phillips-Perron test results are 
presented in Table 4, and also the summary 
in Table 5. The results show that the budget 
deficit and the debt are stationary in Ca-
meroon, Guyana, Indonesia, Jordan, Oman, 
and Tunisia. However, in Malaysia only 
budget deficit is stationary, in Sierra Lion 
only debt is stationary, and in Bahrain and 
Pakistan budget deficit and debt is not sta-
tionary. In both cases, we can reject the hy-
pothesis of a unit root at the 5% level. 
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Table 3: ADF Stationarity test for public debt and budget deficit 
 
Country Sample Variable ADF- Statistic Intercept Lag 
Bahrain 1975 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
1.842405 
-0.734056 
-2.764973*** 
-0.932477 
-2.073306 
-4.062072* 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Cameroon 1975 – 1999 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D  
-0.241807 
 -1.631095 
-2.818839*** 
-1.912982 
-3.477302** 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Guyana 1971 – 1979 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
-1.224234 
-1.823759 
-3.227666** 
-0.064202 
-3.810427* 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Indonesia 1977 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
2.228860 
0.449734 
-4.216108* 
-2.418915 
-1.538336 
-3.937952* 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Jordan 1971 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
-0.384790 
-2.457954 
-4.380202* 
-2.692673 
-2.499551 
-3.043370** 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Malaysia 1960 – 1999 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
0.170079  
-1.944593 
-2.873152*** 
-2.525573 
-3.308256** 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
Oman 1971 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
0.795445  
-2.272315 
-3.446169** 
-1.936083 
-2.936448** 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
Pakistan 1971 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
2.753442 
3.530462*  
-1.279260 
3.530462*  
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
Sierra Lyon 1974 – 2000 (1-L)B (1-L)D 
2.593218* 
4.566917* 
0 
0 
3 
3 
Tunisia 1972 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
3.179721* 
-1.162972 
-3.884458* 
0 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
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Table 4: Phillip Perron Stationarity test for public debt and budget deficit 
 
Country Sample Variable PP-Statistic Intercept Lag 
Bahrain 1975 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
2.282277 
-2.475526 
-6.071453* 
-2.026824 
-2.373377 
-4.377638* 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Cameroon 1975 – 1999 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
0.028667 
-3.809473* 
-2.828303 
-5.416784* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Guyana 1971 – 1997 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
-0.361117 
-3.616891* 
-0.328635 
-3.426923** 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
Indonesia 1977 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
1.712017 
-4.219712** 
-1.607843 
-3.886435** 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Jordan 1971 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
-0.444151 
-7.529863** 
-2.313562 
-6.713696** 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
Malaysia 1960 – 1999 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
0.561448 
-2.618054 
-7.872269* 
-2.196555 
-4.861753** 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Oman 1971 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
-0.589227 
-5.467690* 
-2.790171 
-7.579570* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
Pakistan 1971 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
0.36223 
1.299580 
-8.880784* 
-6.455610* 
0 
1 
2 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Siera Lyon 1974 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
1.007116 
-3.712058* 
7.039164* 
0 
1 
0 
2 
2 
2 
Tunisia 1972 – 2000 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)B 
(1-L)D 
(1-L)D 
8.873310 
-3.803570* 
-3.482472 
-11.67126* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
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Table 5: Summary of fiscal policy sustainability 
 
Country Period Test Performed Sustainability? 
Bahrain 1971 – 2000 Deficit  Public debt 
No 
No 
Cameroon 1971 – 1999 Deficit  Public debt 
Yes 
Yes 
Guyana 1971 – 1979 Deficit  Public debt  
Yes 
Yes 
Indonesia 1977 – 2000 Deficit  Public debt 
Yes 
Yes 
Jordan 1971 – 2000 Deficit  Public debt 
Yes 
Yes 
Malaysia 1971 – 1999 Deficit  Public debt 
Yes 
No 
Oman 1971 – 2000 Deficit  Public debt 
Yes 
Yes 
Pakistan 1971 – 2000 Deficit  Public debt 
No 
No 
Sierra Lyon 1971 – 2000 Deficit  Public debt 
No 
Yes 
Tunisia 1971 – 2000 Deficit  Public debt 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Cointegration Test 
The study of budget constraint and 
the fiscal and monetary policy harmoniza-
tion/ syncronization stationarity and cointe-
gration for each Muslimic country will be 
explained below. Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test and Phillip-Peron Test are used in the 
attempt to validate the sufficient sustainabil-
ity condition. Table 6 and 7 give the station-
arity tests results for the level of the public 
government, taxes, general price rate, and 
seigniorage, with the sample period shown 
in column two. The critical 1 and 5 percent τ 
values with intercept are -3.75 and -3.00, 
respectively. 
The results from the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are reported in 
Table 6. The results show that the process 
(1-L)G is stationary in Bahrain, Guyana, 
Oman, Pakistan, and Tunisia. The process 
(1-L)T is stationary in Bahrain, Guyana, 
Indonesia, Oman, and Tunisia. The process 
(1-L)P is stationary in Bahrain, Guyana, 
Oman, and Tunisia. The process (1-L)S is 
stationary in Bahrain, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
and Tunisia. Similarly, the Phillips-Perron 
test results are presented in Table 7. The 
results show that the process (1-L)G, (1-L)T, 
(1-L)P, and (1-L)S are stationary in all Mus-
limic countries. Only Sierra Lyon, where the 
((1-L)P is not stationary. 
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Table 6: ADF Stationarity test for Consumer Price (P), Government Expenditure (G), 
Tax (T), and Seigniorage (S), for period 1971-2000. 
 
Country Variable ADF-Statistic Intercept Lag 
Bahrain 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-5.895758* 
0.016447 
-3.408646** 
-3.353142** 
-3.220344** 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Cameroon 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-1.756813 
-1.859860 
-2.301993 
-2.054858 
-1.997766 
-2.032664 
-1.756282 
-2.350686 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Guyana 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-0.449698 
-2.284856*** 
-0.828258 
-7.464759* 
-3.509399** 
-0.897320 
-2.143715 
-4.486080* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Indonesia 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-1.793896 
-2.406949 
-5.693968* 
-0.095441 
-2.801723* 
0.210345 
-2.513918 
-3.773838* 
-0.220492 
-4.064832* 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Jordan 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-1.783748 
-2.654631 
-2.466897 
-2.122591 
-1.826304 
-2.061617 
-2.444994 
-2.227495 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Malaysia 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-1.308157 
-2.027921 
-1.059867 
-2.206626 
-1.953926 
-0.392338 
-1.626999 
-1.791065 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
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Table 6: (Continued)    
Country Variable ADF-Statistic Intercept Lag 
Oman 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-3.278110** 
-2.491894 
-3.072949** 
-2.050516 
-6.024389* 
-2.367708 
-4.376554* 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Pakistan 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-1.033039 
-2.780485*** 
-1.975407 
-2.108264 
-3.122884** 
-1.402089 
-2.943044*** 
-4.929924* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Siera Lyon 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
0.386529 
-1.907237 
-0.630104 
-1.705748 
-1.384853 
1.193375 
-1.308678 
-2.571775 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Tunisia 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-1.743968 
-3.118122** 
-1.740539 
-2.460624*** 
-0.876141 
-2.631310*** 
-1.929955 
-4.487848* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
 
Table 7: Phillip Perron Stationarity test for Consumer Price (P), Government Expendi-
ture (G), Tax (T), and Seigniorage (S), for period 1971-2000. 
 
Country Variable PP-Statistic Intercept Lag 
Bahrain 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-4.144902* 
-0.462882 
-7.535731* 
-4.867853* 
-6.050878* 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Cameroon 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-2.579630 
-6.851433* 
-1.442851 
-3.512124** 
-2.433250 
-3.553941** 
-3.519607** 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy and Deficit Budget … (Muhammad Zilal Hamzah & Abd. Ghafar b. Ismail) 
 199 
Table 7: (Continued)    
Country Variable PP-Statistic Intercept Lag 
Guyana 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-0.585881 
-3.533250** 
-2.299329 
-4.489466* 
-1.434908 
-3.951887* 
-0.895421 
-7.166092* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Indonesia 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
(1-L)S 
-2.478036 
-2.792937*** 
0.158506 
-4.100942* 
-1.232257 
-3.875174* 
-0.836362 
-8.053125* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Jordan 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-2.877956*** 
-1.952122 
-4.569516* 
-2.765295** 
-3.406466** 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Malaysia 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-2.407693 
-3.681126* 
-2.233714 
-3.439402** 
-4.446500* 
-4.911833* 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Oman 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-3.278110** 
-3.292740** 
-3.976936* 
-3.174096** 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Pakistan 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-2.045417 
-9.974759* 
-4.241630* 
-2.826197*** 
-4.361661* 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Siera Lyon 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
0.430285 
-5.462715* 
-0.003151 
-3.123428** 
0.442353 
-2.167158 
-6.780989* 
-3.219976** 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Tunisia 
(1-L)G 
(1-L)T 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)P 
(1-L)S 
-3.270908** 
-3.544572** 
-1.081631 
-8.439226* 
-4.088577* 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
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The results of the cointegration test are re-
ported in table 8 and 9. Cointegration test 
for Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, dan Pakistan 
shows that there are cointegration relation-
ship in a set variables: public expenditures 
(LG), taxes (LT), and seigniorage rate (LS) 
and also in a set variables: public expendi-
tures (LG), taxes (LT), and general price 
rate (LP). This finding can explain that cur-
rent expenditures are equal with current 
revenues which come from taxes and seign-
iorage. That’s mean in the long run, gov-
ernment expenditures will not influence the 
government revenues negatively. Also fiscal 
and monetary policy run in synchronization. 
The positive relationship between tax and 
government expenditures shows that the 
increasing in government expenditures will 
increase the tax. 
The cointegration test for Guyana 
and Tunisia shows that there are no cointe-
gration relationship in a set variables: public 
expenditures (LG), taxes (LT), and seign-
iorage rate (LS) but there are cointegration 
relationship in a set variables: public expen-
ditures (LG), taxes (LT), and general price 
rate (LP). This finding can explain that cur-
rent expenditures are not equal with current 
revenues from taxes and seigniorage. It’s 
also implies that, in the long run, govern-
ment expenditures will influence the gov-
ernment revenues negatively but fiscal and 
monetary policy run in synchronization. 
While, the cointegration test for In-
donesia and Sierra Lyon shows that there are 
no cointegration relationship in a set vari-
ables: public expenditures (LG), taxes (LT), 
and seigniorage rate (LS) and also in a set 
variables: public expenditures (LG), taxes 
(LT), and general price rate (LP). This find-
ing can explain that current expenditures are 
not equal with current revenues from taxes 
and seigniorage. Therefore, in the long run, 
government expenditures will influence the 
government revenues negatively. Also fiscal 
and monetary policy do not run in synchro-
nization. 
The cointegration test for Malaysia 
shows that there are cointegration relation-
ship in a set variables: public expenditures 
(LG), taxes (LT), and seigniorage rate (LS) 
but there are not cointegration relationship 
in a set variables: public expenditures (LG), 
taxes (LT), and general price rate (LP). This 
finding can explain that current expenditures 
are equal with current revenues from taxes 
and seigniorage. Hence, in the long run, 
government expenditures do not influence 
the government revenues negatively. Also 
fiscal and monetary policy do not run in 
synchronization. 
 
Table 8: Cointegration Test of Budget Constraint 
Maximum Eigenvalue Trace Test 
Statistic Test Statistic Test Country 
Null ( r = 0 ) Null ( r ≤ 0 ) Null ( r = 0 ) Null ( r ≤ 0 ) 
Bahrain 0.496781* 0.333107 30.69016* 11.46171 
Cameroon NA NA NA NA 
Guyana 0.391078 0.347974 26.99619 13.10637 
Indonesia 0.491234 0.195857 25.54299 6.621505 
Jordan 0.826930** 0.356947* 67.22351** 18.10987* 
Malaysia 0.574472* 0.203855 35.18602* 11.26212 
Oman 0.588010** 0.391704** 46.33719** 21.50802** 
Pakistan 0.482105** 0.385805** 42.25152** 23.82799** 
Siera Lyon 0.468703 0.263413 26.45582 8.747659 
Tunisia 0.439991 0.333495 29.53964 13.30517 
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Table 9: Cointegration Test of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Synchronization 
 
Maximum Eigenvalue Trace Test  
Statistic Test Statistic Test Country 
Null (r = 0) Null (r ≤ 0) Null (r = 0) Null (r ≤ 0) 
Bahrain 0.591923** 0.556470** 47.86712** 22.77074** 
Cameroon NA NA NA NA 
Guyana 0.505289* 0.230299 32.09302* 12.38712 
Indonesia 0.511436 0.280446 29.28830 9.232337 
Jordan 0.792307** 0.519922** 67.52868** 23.52130** 
Malaysia 0.459743 0.222014 29.67134 12.43146 
Oman 0.530704** 0.525439** 48.93765** 27.75503** 
Pakistan 0.685157** 0.375527* 51.97991** 19.62086* 
Siera Lyon 0.273664 0.188056 14.89927 5.946463 
Tunisia 0.723955** 0.330778* 52.23478** 16.19339* 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the government budget 
constraint is the key element of the fiscal 
policy sustainability analysis and also the 
starting point to derive analytical formula-
tions suitable for empirical testing. Through 
stationarity test for the of public debt and 
budget deficit and descriptive analysis of 
government revenues, expenditures, and 
taxes, an attempt was made to assess the 
sustainability of fiscal policy in some mus-
lim countries, for the 1971–2000 period. The 
stationarity of the level difference of the 
public debt and budget deficit is a sufficient 
condition for fiscal policy sustainability. The 
cointegration results show that, first, in Bah-
rain, Jordan, Oman, and Pakistan, the budget 
constraint has cointegration relationship in 
the long run. The fiscal and moneter policy 
could also be synchronizely applied. Sec-
ond, in Indonesia and Sierra Lyon, neither 
budget constraint nor fiscal and monetery 
policy have cointegration relationship. 
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